Adversarial samples are maliciously created inputs that force a machine learning classifier to produce wrong output labels. An adversarial sample is often generated by adding adversarial noise (AN) to a normal sample. Recent literature has pointed out that machine learning classifiers, including deep neural networks (DNN), are vulnerable to AN. Multiple studies have tried to analyze and thus harden machine classifiers under AN. However, they are mostly empirical and provide little understanding of the underlying principles that enable evaluation of the robustness of a classier against AN. This paper proposes a unified framework using two metric spaces to evaluate classifiers' robustness against AN and provides general guidance for hardening such classifiers. The central idea of our work is that for a certain classification task, the robustness of a classifier f 1 against AN is decided by both f 1 and its oracle f 2 (like human annotator of that specific task). In particular: (1) By adding oracle f 2 into the framework, we provide a general definition of the adversarial sample problem. (2) We theoretically formulate a definition that decides whether a classifier is always robust against AN (strongrobustness); (3) Using two metric spaces (X 1 , d 1 ) and (X 2 , d 2 ) defined by f 1 and f 2 respectively, we prove that the topological equivalence between (X 1 , d 1 ) and (X 2 , d 2 ) is sufficient in deciding whether f 1 is strong-robust at test time, or not; (4) For cases that f 1 is not strong-robust, a novel measure referred to as Adversarial Robustness of Classifier (ARC) is defined to quantify the weak-robustness of a classifier against AN by taking the oracle f 2 into account. We theoretically prove that ARC reaches the maximum value if and only if f 1 is strong-robust; Empirically, we find that Siamese architecture can intuitively approach topological equivalence between (X 1 , d 1 ) and (X 2 , d 2 ) and is shown to effectively improve DNN models' robustness against AN.
INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) can efficiently learn highly accurate models from a large corpus of training samples. As a result, DNNs have been demonstrated to perform exceptionally well on multiple machine learning tasks (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Hannun et al., 2014) , some of which are increasingly security-sensitive (Microsoft Corporation, 2015; Dahl et al., 2013; Sharif et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016b) . Unlike machine learning used in other fields, security sensitive tasks involve intelligent and adaptive adversaries responding to the learning systems. Recent studies show that attackers can force many machine learning models, including DNNs, to produce an abnormal output behavior, such as a misclassification. A so-called "adversarial sample" (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Szegedy et al., 2013) is crafted by adding a carefully chosen adversarial perturbation (i.e., adversarial noise) to a correctly classified sample drawn from the data distribution. The goal of this paper is to analyze the robustness of machine learning classifiers and thus enable learning-based classification systems to achieve robust performance when being attacked by "adversarial samples".
Investigating the behavior of machine learning systems in adversarial environments is an emerging topic (Huang et al., 2011; Barreno et al., 2006; Globerson & Roweis, 2006; Biggio et al., 2013;  A variety of recent studies in the deep learning field are about how to find adversarial noise to fool DNN classification and how to design corresponding strategies against such adversarial noise. (Szegedy et al., 2013) firstly points out that convolution NNs are vulnerable to small artificial noises. They use box-constrained L-BFGS to reliably create adversarial samples. Their study also finds that adversarial perturbation generated from one network can also force other networks to produce wrong output. Then (Goodfellow et al., 2014) tries to clarify that the primary cause of such vulnerability is the linear nature of DNNs. They propose an algorithm -"fast gradient sign method" for generating adversarial examples fast, which makes adversarial training practical. More subsequent papers Papernot et al., 2015a; Sabour et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015) have explored other ways of adversarial manipulations on DNN outputs or deep representations recently.
Researchers also try to propose effective countermeasures for making DNN systems robust to noises, that at the worst-case are "adversarial noise". For instance, denoising NN architectures (Vincent et al., 2008; Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Jin et al., 2015) can discover more robust features by using a noise corrupted version of inputs as training samples. A modified distillation strategy (Papernot et al., 2015b ) is proposed to improve the robustness of DNNs against adversarial samples, though is shown to be unsuccessful recently (Carlini & Wagner, 2016a) . More recent techniques incorporate smoothness penalty (Miyato et al., 2016; Zheng et al., 2016) or layer-wise penalty (Carlini & Wagner, 2016b) as a regularization term in the loss function to promote the smoothness of the DNN model distributions. In the broader "secure machine learning" field, researchers also make attempts for hardening learning systems before. For instance: (1) Barreno et al. (Barreno et al., 2010) and Biggio et al. (Biggio et al., 2008) propose a method to introduce some randomness in the selection of classification boundaries; (2) A few recent studies (Xiao et al., 2015; consider the impact of using reduced feature sets on classifiers under adversarial attacks. (Xiao et al., 2015) proposes an adversary-aware feature selection model that can improve classifier's robustness against adversarial attacks by incorporating specific assumptions about the adversary's data manipulation strategy. (3) Multiple studies have modeled adversarial scenarios with formal frameworks representing the interaction between the classifier and the adversary. Related efforts include perfect information assumption (Dalvi et al., 2004) , assuming a polynomial number of membership queries (Lowd & Meek, 2005) , formalizing as a two-person sequential Stackelberg game (Brückner & Scheffer, 2011; Liu & Chawla, 2010) , a min-max strategy (training a classifier with best performance under the worst noise) (Dekel et al., 2010; Globerson & Roweis, 2006) , exploring online and non-stationary learning by (Dahlhaus, 1997; Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006) , and formalizing as an adversarial reinforcement learning problem (Uther & Veloso, 1997) .
Despite some previous studies (Zheng et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2016b; a) , there exists little theoretical understanding today of how to evaluate the robustness of a machine-learning classifier against an adversary and how to design and harden classifiers. This paper aims to allow a classifier designer to understand why the classification performance degrades under adversarial attack at test time, and thus, to design a better classifier. In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Section 2 points out that previous definitions of adversarial examples have overlooked the importance of the oracle of the task of interest. This paper proposes a theoretical framework connecting the robustness of a classifier against adversarial noises to the consistency of the classifier with the oracle (Definition (2.1)).
• Using two metric spaces corresponding to the classifier and the oracle, Section 3 proves that if these two metric spaces are topologically equivalent, the classifier is always robust to adversarial noises at test time.
We use this framework to analyze the robustness of DNN in Section 3.6.
• For cases that f 1 is not strong-robust, a novel measure, named as adversarial robustness of classifier (ARC), is proposed in Section 4.1 to quantify the robustness of a classifier by taking the oracle f 2 into account. ARC measures weak-robustness by using the expectation of how difficult it is to search for adversarial samples. We prove that ARC reaches the maximum value if and only if f 1 is strong-robust.
• In Section 4.2 we find that a defense strategy, named as "Siamese training", can intuitively help a DNN classifier near topological equivalence between its metric space (X 1 , d 1 ) and oracle's metric space (X 2 , d 2 ) using Siamese architecture, consequently making DNN models achieve better robustness against adversarial attacks. Section 4.2.2 includes experimental results showing that Siamese training helps DNN classifiers achieve better ARC and ARCA than another state-of-the-art defense strategy in an adversarial setting.
ORACLE MATTERS FOR DEFINING ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES AT TEST TIME
This section provides a formal definition of an adversarial attack at test time, by including the notion of the oracle (see Definition (2.1)). In particular, we first introduce several previous descriptions of adversarial attacks and show that previous definitions have overlooked the importance of the oracle. To overcome this issue, a generalized formulation for "adversarial noise problem" 1 is defined and relates to the consistency between a classifier and its oracle. All previous definitions of "adversarial examples" are special cases of our formulation. The oracle for the same task (see Definition (2.1)) X Input space (e.g., {0, 1, 2, . . . , 255}
32×32×3
for cifar10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009 )) Y Output space (e.g., {1, 2, 3, . . . , 10} for cifar10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) 
Feature space after feature extraction with respect to the learned classifier f 1 . X 2 Feature space after feature extraction with respect to the oracle f 2 . d 1 (·, ·) The distance/metric function with respect to the learned predictor f 1 . d 2 (·, ·) The distance/metric function with respect to the oracle f 2 . a.e. almost everywhere (Folland, 2013 ) Table 1 provides a list of important notations we use in the paper. For a specific classification task, a learned classifier could be represented as f 1 : X → Y , where X = R p represents the sample space and Y is the output space. As f 1 is a classifier, the output space Y is a categorical set. Let x be a sample drawing from the sample space X.
BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS FORMULATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIER UNDER
ADVERSARIAL NOISE AT TEST TIME To attack such a prediction function f 1 in the test phase, the basic idea proposed in the recent literature is to generate a misclassified sample x by perturbing a correctly classified sample x, with an adversarial perturbation (noise) r, so that:
If x and x are defined in a vector space, r = x − x . Otherwise, the meaning of r depends on the specific data type that x and x belong to 2 . Naturally, the attacker wants to control the size of the perturbation r to ensure the perturbed sample x still stays as close as possible to the original sample x. For example, in the image classification case, Eq. (2.1) uses the gradient information to get such a r that makes human annotators still recognize x as almost the same as x, though the classifier will predict x into a different class. In another PDF malware (Xu et al., 2016) case, Eq. (2.1) found r by genetic programming. The modified malicious PDF files will be recognized as malicious by the oracle (a machine decides if a PDF file is malicious or not by actually running it), but are classified as benign by the state-of-art machine learning classifier:PDFRate (Xu et al., 2016) . To control the size of the perturbation, it is necessary to have a distance function defined to measure ∆(x, x ). Previous researchers have used different distance functions to measure the perturbation size, including 2 -norm, However, a distance function is defined on some space. To the best of our knowledge, all previous works didn't clearly specify that space. This is because they have not realized the importance of the oracle classifier for the same task on hand. The goal of machine learning is to train a predictor function f 1 , which approximates the oracle classifier f 2 for the same classification task. For example, in image classification tasks, the oracle f 2 is often human annotators. In this paper, the notion of "oracle" is defined as follows. Definition 2.1. "Oracle" represents a decision process generating ground truth labels for the specific task under interest. Each oracle is task-specific and with finite knowledge.
Implicitly by the definitions of adversarial examples, a pair of samples (x, x ) should be classified into the same class by the oracle classifier. Therefore, the distance function d should be defined in the feature space of the oracle. We use d 2 to denote such a distance function defined by the oracle. It is worth to point out that r in Eq. (2.1) was not clearly defined by the previous studies. Instead, our formulation d 2 (x, x ) describes the difference between x and x more precisely and provides better insights (see discussions in Section 3).
Most previous definitions about attacking machine learning models (Biggio et al., 2013; Lowd & Meek, 2005) view generating an adversarial sample as a constrained optimization problem. Eq. (2.2) provides a general formulation of these studies using f 1 and d 2 . Table 2 summarizes different choices of f 1 and d 2 used in the recent literature. For instance, the authors of (Biggio et al., 2013) Previous studies
subject to: l = f 1 (x ) (Biggio et al., 2013) Support vector machine 2 argmin x Loss(f 1 (x ), −1), subject to: f 1 (x) = 1 (Kantchelian et al., 2015) Decision tree and Random forest 2 , 1 , Grosse et al., 2016) Convolutional neural networks
2 For example, in the case of strings, r represents the difference between two strings.
BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS ALGORITHMS GENERATING "ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES"
To fool classifiers at test time, several approaches have been implemented to generate "adversarial perturbations" by solving Eq. (2.2). According to Eq. (2.2), an adversarial sample should be able to change the classification result f 1 (x), which is a discrete value. To solve Eq. (2.2), we need to transform the constraint f 1 (x) = f 1 (x ) into an optimizable formulation. Then we can easily use the Lagrangian multiplier to solve Eq. (2.2). All the previous studies define a loss function Loss(·, ·) to quantify the constraint f 1 (x) = f 1 (x ). This loss function can be the same with the training loss, or it can be chosen differently, such as hinge loss or cross entropy loss.
We summarize three typical attacking studies here:
Gradient ascent method (Biggio et al., 2013) Machine learning has been popular in classifying malicious (y = 1) versus benign (y = −1) in computer security tasks. For such context, a simple way to solve Eq. (2.2) is through gradient ascent. To minimize the size of the perturbation and maximize the adversarial effect, the noise should follow the gradient direction (i.e., the direction providing the largest increase of function value, here from y = −1 to 1). Therefore, the perturbation r in each iteration is calculated as:
By varying , this method can find a sample x with regard to
Box L-BFGS adversary (Szegedy et al., 2013) This study views the adversarial problem as a constrained optimization problem, i.e., find a minimum perturbation in the restricted sample space. The perturbation is obtained by using Box-constrained L-BFGS to solve the following equation: argmin
Here p is total number of features. For an image classification task, it is 3 times the total number of pixels of a RGB image). l is a target label, which is different from the original label.
Fast gradient sign method (Goodfellow et al., 2014) Fast gradient sign method proposed by (Goodfellow et al., 2014) view d 2 as the ∞ -norm. In this case, a natural choice is to make the attack strength at every feature dimension to be the same. The perturbation is obtained by solving the following equation: argmin
Therefore the perturbation can be calculated directly by: r = sign(∇ z Loss(f 1 (z), f 1 (x))) (2.6) Here the loss function is the function used to train the neural network. A recent paper (Kurakin et al., 2016) shows that adversarial examples generated by fast gradient sign method are misclassified even after these images have been recaptured by cameras.
A NOVEL FORMULATION OF "ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES": ORACLE MATTERS
As we have pointed out, previous studies overlook the importance of the oracle function f 2 ( Definition (2.1)) and have the assumption of a distance function in Eq. (2.2). We think the distance function used in Eq. (2.2) is actually d 2 defined in the feature space of the oracle f 2 . Rather than relying on d 2 to indirectly consider f 2 , we propose the following unified definition for "Adversarial test sample" using oracle f 2 directly for a classification task.
In this paper, the oracle is defined as a decision process that provide the ground truth for a specific classification task ( Definition (2.1)). Oracle classifier f 2 (·) is assumed to task-specific with finiteknowledge and with its noise-level upper bounded. For example, in an image classification task, the oracle can be a group of human annotators that provide the ground truth labels for the target classification task. In malicious PDF detection task, the oracle decides whether a PDF file is malicious or benign.
In addition, we can decompose f 2 as f 2 = g 2 • c 2 where g 2 : X → X 2 represents the feature extraction and c 2 : X 2 → Y performs the operation of classification. Here, X 2 describes the feature space of the oracle. For instance, in image classification tasks, X 2 is the combination of all informative pixels. We illustrate this process in Figure 1 . Definition 2.2. Adversarial test sample for a classification task: Suppose we have two functions f 1 and f 2 . f 1 : X → Y is the classification function of learned from a training set and f 2 : X → Y is the classification function of the oracle that generate ground-truth labels for the same task. The adversarial examples at test time can be defined as:
Given a sample x, to find sample x , so that f 1 (x) = f 1 (x ) and f 2 (x) = f 2 (x ). where x, x ∈ X. This definition can be formulated in a similar format as Eq. (2.2): Find x
Most previous studies, such as the three methods we've mentioned above, tried to find an adversarial sample x that is similar to a given x. We would like to point out that Eq. (2.7) may give optimal solutions of x that are not close to x. For example, (Xu et al., 2016) used genetic programming to generate multiple possible malicious variants from a seed (one malicious PDF file) that can fool PDFRate (a malicious PDF classifier) to classify them as benign. The distances of these variants to the seed are not necessarily small. For such cases, our general definition of "adversarial examples" by Eq. (2.2) still fits, while Eq. (2.2) does not.
Most previous studies measure the difference between adversarial sample and original sample using a distance function d 2 . Although it seems to be a natural choice, it makes an implicit underlying assumption: f 2 is almost everywhere (a.e.) continuous. We briefly discuss the continuity assumption as follows:
∀ > 0 and x ∈ X a.e., ∃δ > 0, so that when
For notation simplicity, we use the term "continuous a.e." for continuous almost everywhere 3 in the rest of the paper. The fact that f 1 and f 2 are continuous a.e. is a hidden assumption made by most previous studies (Biggio et al., 2013; Lowd & Meek, 2005) .
Besides, almost all popular machine learning classifiers satisfy the a.e. continuity assumption. For instance, a deep neural network is certainly continuous a.e.. Similarly to the results shown by (Szegedy et al., 2013) , DNNs satisfy that
In appendix Section 6.5, we show that if f 1 is not continuous a.e., it is not robust to any types of noise. Considering the generalization assumption of machine learning, machine learning classifiers should satisfy the continuity a.e. assumption.
USING TWO METRIC SPACES TO UNDERSTAND STRONG-ROBUSTNESS OF MACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIER AGAINST ADVERSARIAL NOISE
As shown in Figure 1 , we assume a common machine learning classifier f 1 = g 1 • c 1 , where g 1 : X → X 1 represents the feature extraction 4 and function c 1 : X 1 → Y performs the operation of classification. In the last section, we decompose f 2 as f 2 = g 2 • c 2 where g 2 : X → X 2 represents the feature extraction and c 2 : X 2 → Y performs the operation of classification. Here, X 2 describes the feature space of the oracle.
The reason why we need the above decomposition of f 1 and f 2 is to introduce the two metric spaces defined in X 1 and X 2 . In this section, we theoretically prove a special relationship between two metric spaces is a sufficient condition in determining whether f 1 is strong-robust at test time, or not. Then we extend the discussion from metric spaces into two pseudometric spaces defined in X and prove that a special relationship between two pseudometric spaces is sufficient and necessary in determining the strong-robustness of f 1 .
Figure 1: Example of a learned predictor and oracle for classifying images of hand-written "0". Both include two steps: feature extraction and classification. The upper sub-figure is about the learned machine classifier f 1 and the lower sub-figure is about the oracle f 2 . The learned classifier f 1 transforms data samples from the original space X to an embedded metric space (X 1 , d 1 ) using its feature extraction step. Here, d 1 is the similarity measure on the feature space X 1 . Classification models like DNN cover the feature extraction step in the model, though many other models like decision tree need hard-crafted or domain-specific feature extraction. Then f 1 can use softmax function to decide the classification result y ∈ Y . Similarly, human oracle f 2 transforms data samples from the original space X into an embedded metric space (X 2 , d 2 ) by its feature extraction. Here, d 2 is the corresponding similarity measure. Then the oracle get the classification result y ∈ Y using the feature representation of samples (X 2 , d 2 ).
METRIC SPACES AND TOPOLOGICAL EQUIVALENCE OF TWO METRIC SPACES
Now we briefly introduce the concept of metric space and topological equivalence. A metric on a set/space X is a function d : X × X → [0, ∞] satisfying four properties: (1) non-negativity, (2) identity of indiscernibles, (3) symmetry and (4) triangle inequality. In machine learning, for example, the most widely used metric is Euclidean distance. Kernel based methods, such as SVM, kernel regression and Gaussian process, consider samples in a Reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). The metric in a RKHS is naturally defined as:
As shown in Figure 1 , the two metric spaces in our formulation are (X 1 , d 1 ) and (X 2 , d 2 ). For a pair of samples (x, x ) (x, x ∈ X), the feature extraction of f 1 and f 2 transfer (x, x ) to (x 1 , x 1 ) (x 1 , x 1 ∈ X 1 ) and (x 2 , x 2 ) (x 2 , x 2 ∈ X 2 ). Then the adversarial problem defined by Definition (2.2) is to find a pair of samples (x, x ) satisfying that d 2 (x 2 , x 2 ) is small while d 1 (x 1 , x 1 ) is large. Now we present an important definition "topological equivalence", that can represent a special relationship between two metric spaces. Definition 3.1. Topological Equivalence (Kelley, 1975) A function or mapping h(·) from one topological space to another is continuous if the inverse image of any open set is open. If this continuous function is one-to-one and onto, and the inverse of the function is also continuous, then the function is called a homeomorphism and the domain of the function, in our case (X 1 , d 1 ), is said to be homeomorphic to the output range, e.g., here (X 2 , d 2 ). In another word, metric space (X 1 , d 1 ) is topological equivalent to metric space (X 2 , d 2 ).
We can state this definition as the following equation:
Here and δ are two small constants.
This definition leads to a number of important theorems in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3.
3.2 USING f 1 AND f 2 TO DEFINE STRONG-ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ADVERSARIAL NOISE
We then apply reverse-thinking on Eq. (2.7) and propose the following definition of strongrobustness for classification models against adversarial noise: Definition 3.2. Strong-robustness of a Classification model Given a test sample x ∈ X a.e., if ∀x ∈ X and f 2 (x) = f 2 (x ), we always have that f 1 (x) = f 1 (x ). Then we call the learned predictor f 1 (·) is strong-robust to adversarial samples at test time.
This definition of classifier's strong-robustness can be reformatted into the following equation:
We can extend definition above to more complex models, like LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) . (See extensions in the Appendix:Section 6).
Meanwhile, we want to emphasize that a classifier needs to be both strong-robust and accurate in an adversarial setting. For example, a trivial example for strong-robust models is f 1 (x) ≡ 1, ∀x ∈ X. However, it is a useless model since it doesn't have any prediction power.
Next, we prove that the robustness of a certain classification model is determined by two metric spaces corresponding to f 1 and f 2 .
TOPOLOGICAL EQUIVALENCE OF TWO METRIC SPACES
By the continuity assumption and the Definition (3.2), we have the following theorem describing a sufficient condition that determines whether a classification model is strong-robust or not. Theorem 3.3. If (X 1 , d 1 ) and (X 2 , d 2 ) are topological equivalent, then the learned classifier f 1 (·) is strong-robust to adversarial samples at test time.
By the continuity assumption, it is easy to prove that Eq. (3.2) is equivalent to Eq. (3.5) (Details in Appendix:Section 7.1).
By Theorem (3.3), the topological equivalence between two metric spaces is sufficient in deciding the robustness of a classification model. This result also shows that parameters of a model have no impact on the model's adversarial robustness (if they are not related to the metric spaces). Before applying our theorem to real problems, we propose two useful corollaries that are closely related to pratical machine learning setting. Corollary 3.4. If d 1 and d 2 are norms and X 1 = X 2 = R n , then the learned predictor f 1 (·) is strong-robust to adversarial samples at test time.
Th above corollary shows that if a learned classifier and oracle classifier share the same derived feature space (X 1 = X 2 ), the learned classifier is strong-robust when two metrics are both norm functions (even if not the same norm). We can call this corollary as "norm doesn't matter". Many interesting phenomena can be answered by Corollary (3.4). For instance, for a norm regularized classifier, this corollary answers an important question that whether a different norm function will influence the performance under adversarial samples or not. This corollary indicates that changing to a different metric function may not change the robustness of the model under adversarial attacks.
FINER TOPOLOGY (PSEUDOMETRIC SPACE
(X, d 1 ) THAN PSEUDOMETRIC SPACE (X, d 2 ))
IS SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY IN DETERMINING THE STRONG-ROBUSTNESS
We have briefly reviewed the concept of metric space in Section 3.1 and proposed the related Theorem (3.3) in Section 3.3. Our previous theorems rely on feature spaces X 1 and X 2 (See Figure 1) . Next, we extend the theorem to the original space X by using a more general concept Pseudometric Space
.
If a distance function d : X × X → [0, ∞] has the following three properties: (1) non-negativity, (2) symmetry and (3) triangle inequality, we call d is a pseudometric or generalized metric. The space (X, d ) is a pseudometric space or generalized metric space. It is worth to point out that the generalized metric space is a special case of topological space and metric space is a special case of pseudometric space.
As shown in Figure 1 , we can decompose a common machine learning classifier f 1 = g 1 • c 1 , where g 1 : X → X 1 represents the feature extraction and c 1 : X 1 → Y performs the operation of classification. Assume there exists a pseudometric d 1 (·, ·) on X and a metric
3) Since d 1 is a metric in X 1 , d 1 fulfills the (1) non-negativity, (2) symmetry and (3) triangle inequality properties. However, d 1 may not satisfy the identity of indiscernible property (i.e., making it not a metric). For example, suppose g 1 only selects the first three features from X. Two samples x and x have the same value in the first three features but different values in the rest features. Clearly, x = x , but d 1 (x, x ) = d 1 (g 1 (x), g 1 (x )) = 0. This shows that d 1 (·, ·) is a pseudometric but not a metric in X. Similarly, a pseudometric d 2 for the oracle can be defined as follow:
To analyze the strong robustness problem in the original feature space X, we assume to a generalized metric (pseudometric) space (X, d 1 ) for f 1 and a generalized metric (pseudometric) space (X, d 2 ) for f 2 . Now we can analyze f 1 and f 2 on the same feature space X but two different pseudometrics. This makes it possible to define a sufficient and necessary conditions for the strong robustness of f 1 against adversarial noise. Before introducing this condition, we need to briefly introduce the definition of topology and finer/coarser topology here: Definition 3.5. A topology τ is a collection of open sets in a topological space X.
For pseudometric space, the topology τ is generated by the collection of {B(x, δ)} (i.e., containing {B(x, δ)}, the infinite/finite number of union of them and the finite number of intersection of them), where x ∈ X and B(x, δ) = {z|d(x, z) < δ}. Definition 3.6. Suppose τ 1 and τ 2 are two typologies in space X. If τ 2 ⊆ τ 1 , the topology τ 2 is called a coarser (weaker or smaller) topology than the topology τ 1 , and τ 1 is called a finer (stronger or larger) topology than τ 2 .
Based on Definition (3.6) we have the following Theorem:
Theorem 3.7. A machine-learning classifier f 1 is strong-robust against adversarial test samples if and only if (X, d 1 ) is a finer topology than (X, d 2 ).
See its proof in appendix Section 7.1.
We can also state this sufficient and necessary condition as the following equation: ∀x, x ∈ X, d 2 (x, x ) < δ ⇒ d 1 (x, x ) < (3.5) Here and δ are two small scalars.
Based on Theorem (3.7), we have the following corollary:
, n 1 > n 2 , X 2 X 1 , d 1 = d 2 and d 1 , d 2 are norm function, then the learned predictor f 1 (·) is not strong-robust to adversarial sample at test time.
Similar to the Corollary (3.4), this corollary shows that even a small difference between two feature spaces can make the learned predictor f 1 (·) vulnerable to adversarial samples. Therefore, the feature selection step is crucial in determining whether a predictor is strong-robust or not in adversarial test setting. Regardless of the model itself, we need to carefully select the features before the operation of classification.
A CASE STUDY: WHY THEOREM (3.3) AND THEOREM (3.7) ARE IMPORTANT ?
Summarizing Theorem (3.3), Theorem (3.7), Corollary (3.4) and Corollary (3.8), the robustness of a learned classifier is decided by two factors: (1) the difference between two derived feature space; (2) the difference between the metric functions. In addition, these two corollaries also show that the difference between the feature spaces is more important than the difference between two metric functions. In Table 3 , we provide a list of situations that Theorems proposed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.4 can determine whether a classifier f 1 is strong-robust against adversarial samples or not. Based on n 1 > n 2 , X 2 X 1 Not strong-robust Corollary (3.8)
By Corollary (3.8), if an unrelated feature is selected in the feature selection step, then no matter how well the model is trained, it is not strong-robust to adversarial samples. Actually, we want to show that a model trained by this way is often prone to adversaries.
Here's an example. Figure 2 shows a situation that the oracle only uses one feature to classify items.
A machine classifier uses an extra unrelated feature and successfully classifies all the items. However, it's very easy to find an adversary by simply adding a perturbation using the extra feature. In Figure 2 , the red circle is such an adversarial sample, which changes the prediction but is very close to the original sample in the oracle space.
In real-world applications, such attacks can be, for example adding words with a very small font size in a spam E-mail, that is invisible to a human annotator. When a learning-based classifier tries to utilize such extra words, it can lead to a wrong (non-spam) prediction.
Another interesting interesting issue worth of investigation is the relationship between robustness and accuracy. Clearly, the performance of a learning model is related to its feature space. The topological space provides a better understanding of the feature space: If a model misses discovering some related features, the accuracy will drop. If the model uses extra unrelated features, it will not be strong-robust to adversarial attacks. We can achieve a robust and accurate model only if we can find a feature space that is topologically equivalent to the feature space of the oracle model. Guided by this idea, making a model robust is closely related to choosing a better feature space, and therefore it will improve the performance of the model. The red circle denotes an adversarial sample, which is very close to its original seed sample in the oracle feature space, but far from the seed sample in the feature space of the trained classifier.
A CASE STUDY: ARE DEEP NEURAL NETS STRONGLY ROBUST ?
In this section, we apply the above theorems to deep neural networks (DNN) classifier. More specifically, we find that (i) DNNs are not strong-robust against adversarial attacks; and (ii) this weakness is an important limitation and should be improved to get better models.
Researchers have proposed different strategies to generate adversarial samples attacking deep neural networks (e.g., (Szegedy et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; He et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016a; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2015b) ). Here we focus on an image classification application with symbols defined as follows:
• f 1 (·): f 1 (·) is a DNN classifier with multiple layers, including linear perceptron layers, activation layers, convolutional layers and softmax decision layer.
• (X 1 , d 1 ): X 1 denotes the feature space discovered by the layer right before the last fully connected layer. This feature space is automatically extracted from the original image space (e.g., RGB representation) by the DNN. (X, d 1 ) is defined by d 1 using Eq. (3.3).
• (X 2 , d 2 ): X 2 denotes the feature space that oracle (e.g., human annotators) used to decide groundtruth labels of training images. For example, a human annotator needs to recognize a hand-written digit "0". X 2 includes what patterns he/she needs for such a decision.
For DNN, it is difficult to derive a precise analytic form of d 1 (or d 1 ). But we can observe some properties of d 1 through experimental results. For instance, Table 4 shows properties of d 1 (and d 1 ) from performing testing experiments on a state-of-art residual network. The model we use is a 200-layer residual network (He et al., 2015) trained on Imagenet dataset (Deng et al., 2009) by Facebook 7 .
In Table 4 , we generate two types of test samples from 50000 images in the validation set of Imagenet:
(1) 50000 randomly perturbed images. The random perturbations for each image is generated by first fixing the value on every dimension to be the same, and then randomly assigning the sign on every dimension as + or − (with probability 1/2). In this way, the size of the perturbation can be described by ||x − x || ∞ that we name as the level of attacking power ( later defined in Eq. (4.8)).
(2) 50000 adversarially perturbed images. We use the fast-gradient sign method (introduced in Section 2.2) to generate such adversarial perturbations on each seed image. The "attacking power" of such adversarial perturbations uses the same formula as Eq. (4.8). The first column of Table 4 shows different attack powers ( Eq. (4.8)) we use in the experiment. The second column shows the accuracy of running the DNN model on the first group of image samples and the third column shows the accuracy of running the DNN model on the second group of image samples. From Table 4 , we can see the accuracy of the DNN model in the adversarial setting is very bad. Clearly, the performance on random perturbed data is much better than performance on maliciously perturbed data. Comparing the second column and the third column in Table 4 , we can conclude that d 1 (and d 1 ) in a random direction is larger than d 1 (and d 1 ) in the adversarial direction. This indicates that a round sphere in (X 1 , d 1 ) (and (X, d 1 )) corresponds to a very thin high-dimensional ellipsoid in (X, || · ||) (illustrated by the left half of Figure 3 ).
The phenomenon we observed can be explained by Figure 3 . Figure 3 (I) shows a sphere in (X, d 1 ) and Figure 3 (III) shows a sphere in (X 1 , d 1 ). They correspond to the very thin high-dimensional ellipsoid in (X, || · ||) in Figure 3 (V). The norm function || · || is defined in space X and is applicationdependent. In the case of Table 4 , || · || = || · || ∞ . Differently, for human oracle a sphere in (X, d 2 ) (shown in Figure 3 (II)) or in (X 2 , d 2 ) (shown in Figure 3 (IV)) corresponds to an ellipsoid in (X, || · ||), however, not including very-thin directions (shown in Figure 3 (VI) ). When the attackers try to minimize the perturbation size using the distance d 2 , the thin direction of ellipsoid in Figure 3 (V) is exactly the adversarial direction. Human oracle does not have such a problem.
This observation inspires us to design strategies to measure and improve the level of robustness of DNN against adversarial samples in the next Section. Last section's analysis indicates that strong-robustness is a strong condition of machine learning classifiers and requires thorough understanding of oracle. Since many state-of-the-art learning models, including DNNs, are not strong-robust, it is important to understand and quantify how far they are away from strong-robustness. We name such situations as "weak-robustness" and propose a quantitative measure to describe how robust a classification model is against adversarial attacks named as Adversarial Robustness of Classifiers (ARC). Our analysis of weak-robustness has the following contributions:
• (1) We propose a measure ARC to quantify a classifier's weak-robustness by considering both the predictor f 1 and the oracle f 2 (introduced in Section 2). Measures proposed by previous studies (Papernot et al., 2015b; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015) simply calculate the average of model accuracy on adversarial samples, which ignores the importance of oracle.
• (2) Similar to how Section 3 defines strong-robustness, we connect the notion of weak-robustness and ARC to Definition (2.2) (our general definition of Adversarial test sample for a classification task) as well.
• (3) We further prove that a classifier f 1 is strong-robust against adversarial samples if and only if its ARC achieves the maximum (1 since ARC is rescaled to [0, 1] ). This clearly shows that the weak-robustness is quantitatively related to the strong-robustness.
• (4) As discussed in Section 3.5, we also want to jointly consider the weak-robustness and accuracy.
This results in a revised ARC measurement: ARCA (proposed Eq. (4.3)).
A NOVEL MEASURE: ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS OF CLASSIFIERS (ARC) TO QUANTIFY MODEL ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ADVERSARIAL TEST SAMPLES
We design a measure to a measure named as Adversarial Robustness for Classifiers (ARC)) to quantify the level of weak-robustness of a machine-learning classifier. This measure is based on the expectation of how difficult it is to generate adversarial samples. Definition 4.1. Adversarial Robustness of Classifiers (ARC)
By adding the constraint f 2 (x) = f 2 (x ) into Eq. (2.2), we define a measure quantifying the robustness of machine learning classifiers against adversarial samples.
Two recent studies (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2015b) propose two similar measures both assuming d 2 as norm functions. They do not consider the importance of oracle. More importantly, (Papernot et al., 2015b) does not provide any computable way to calculate the measure. In (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015) , the measure is normalized by the size of the test samples, while no evidence exists to show that the size of perturbation is related to the size of test samples.
The fact that previous measures neglect oracle f 2 leads to a severe problem: the generated adversarial samples are not necessarily valid. This is because if the size of perturbation is too large, oracle f 2 may classify the perturbed sample into a different class (different from the class of the seed sample).
This motivates us to design a computable criteria to estimate Definition (4.1). For instance, for image classification tasks, we can choose d 2 = || · || ∞ as an example. Then in Eq. (4.1),
, we need to make some assumption. Assume that there exists a threshold η, that any perturbation larger than η will change the classification of oracle f 2 . That is if ||x − x || ∞ > η, then f 2 (x) = f 2 (x ). More concretely, for image classification tasks, as the input space is discrete (with every dimension ranging from 0 to 255), ARC can be estimated by the following Eq. (4.2):
It is important to understand the relationship between strong-robustness and weak-robustness. We provides an important theorem as follows that clearly shows the weak-robustness is quantitatively related to the strong-robustness. The proofs are included in Section 7.1.
A measure combining Adversarial Robustness of Classifiers with Accuracy (ARCA) As we have discussed in the Section 3.5, both accuracy and robustness are important properties in determining whether a classification model is referred or not. Therefore we combine accuracy and ARC into the following unified measure:
Retraining a classification model using adversarial test samples: A trivial hardening solution is retraining the model by the adversarial test samples. In fact, this approach tries to solve the following optimization: argmax
However, since ARC is not related to the accuracy measure, retraining by the adversarial samples might reduce the accuracy. Instead, a hardening strategy considering both adversarial robustness and accuracy's more desired.
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: IMPROVING DNN MODELS' ARCA
In this section, we show one possible deep-learning way to improve DNNs' ARCA, consequently improving the robustness against adversarial samples.
USING "SIAMESE TRAINING" TO IMPROVE ADVERSARIAL-ROBUSTNESS AND ACCURACY OF A DNN TOGETHER
The goal of this paper is to understand and design "good" machine-learning classifiers that can achieve not only high prediction accuracy but also obtain model robustness against adversarial samples. Therefore when focusing on deep learning, we aim to train a DNN model to achieve better ARCA (defined in Eq. (4.5)). argmax
Inspired by the above reformulation, a potential training strategy can be minimizing two loss functions L 1 and L 2 at the same time. Here L 1 represents the loss function used in training DNNs to improve the accuracy, and L 2 represents the control of adversarial robustness. Then Eq. (4.5) can be reformulated and generalized as following: argmin
One intuitive formulation of we can formulate the second loss can be:
Here D(·) represents a function measuring the difference of two inputs. The two inputs can be the prediction outputs of x and x by f 1 . They can also be the middle layer representations (by g 1 ) of x and x by f 1 .
We name the strategy minimizing the loss defined in Eq. (4.7) as "Siamese Training". Because this formulation is closely related to Siamese network (Bromley et al., 1993) , a classical deep-learning approach proposed for learning embedding. It has long been used in many real applications, like face recognition (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) and dimension reduction (Hadsell et al., 2006) . A sketch of the Siamese architecture is shown in Figure 4 . Basically, a Siamese network contains two copies of a DNN model sharing the same weights. The loss function of the Siamese network can be any distance measure as long as differentiable. The input of the Siamese network is a pair of data samples.
The process of Siamese Training is summarized by the Algorithm 1 in Section 8. In "Siamese Training" experiments discussed in the next subsection, we choose Euclidean distance · 2 for D(·) (however, many other choices are possible). More specifically, the idea of Siamese training is to feed a slightly perturbed input x together with its original seed x to the Siamese network. By penalizing the difference between middle-layer (g 1 (·)) outputs of (x, x ), "Siamese Training" can push two metric spaces (X 1 , d 1 ) and (X 2 , d 2 ) to approach topology equivalence, and thus increase the robustness of the model.
This can be concluded from Figure 3 . Previous studies (Summarized in Table 2 ) normally assume d 2 is a norm function || · ||. Indicated in Figure 3 , the issue of adversarial samples on DNN comes from the fact that (X 1 , d 1 ) becomes a high-dimensional thin ellipsoid in (X, || · ||). Therefore we hypothesize that a potential strategy making the ellipsoid not too thin, might improve the adversarial robustness of DNN model. Siamese Training is exactly such a strategy. Because for a pair of inputs (x, x ) that are close to each other (i.e., ||x − x || is small) in (X, || · ||), Siamese training pushes them to be close also in (X 1 , d 1 ) . As a result, this means that asphere in (X 1 , d 1 ) maps to a not-too-thin high-dimensional ellipsoid in (X, || · ||). Therefore the adversarial robustness of DNN model after Siamese training may improve.
Siamese training is inspired by a recent study (Zheng et al., 2016) The author tries to increase the model robustness by pushing the KL divergence between the outputs small. Another recent work (Lee et al., 2015) proposes a hardening process very similar to Siamese training. Differently we use randomly perturbed sample as x , while this paper use adversarially perturbed sample as x , though both trying to match the middle layer outputs.
The main purpose of covering Siamese training in this paper is to provide an empirical study showing how our theorems can be useful for understanding and analyzing a specific hardening strategy. • CIFAR-10: CIFAR-10 is an image classification dataset released by (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009 ). The training set contains 50,000 32x32 color images in 10 classes, and the test set contains 10,000 32x32 color images.
• VGG model: We choose a VGG model (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) as a base DNN model.
The VGG model in our experiment have 16 weight layers (55 layers in total).
We compare "Siamese training" with two baseline strategies: (1) original training without any extra hardening strategy, and (2) stability training proposed in (Zheng et al., 2016) .
Siamese Training variations and hyperparameters: We implement two variations of Siamese Training.
(1) Siamese training; (2) Siamese training used as a regularization item (Section 4.2.1).
We choose SGD as the optimization method, and Euclidean distance as the distance measure for the siamese network. According to the result of (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) , on the CIFAR-10 dataset, we train all the models for 200 epochs. Initial learning rate is set to be 0.1, and let it drop with rate 0.2 at the 60th, 120th and 160th epochs. To be fair, when comparing different hardening strategies we use the same hyperparameters.
Evaluation Metrics:
• Test accuracy: We use top-1 test accuracy as the performance metric. It is defined as the number of successfully classified samples dividing the number of all test samples. The base model achieve accuracy when there's no adversarial attack. • ARC ( Eq. (4.2)) : We use ARC to measure the adversarial robustness of each model. η is chosen to be 10.
• ARCA: ( Eq. (4.3)) : We use ARCA to measure the total performance of each model. We generate adversarial samples using the fast gradient sign method, in which the power of the adversary attack can be easily controlled. By controlling the power of fast-sign attacks, we can obtain a more complete view of how the accuracy changes according to different attack powers.
In the following analysis, the attack power is defined as: P = ||x − x || ∞ (4.8) For image classification tasks, we control the perturbed sample to be still in the valid input space, that every dimension of the perturbed samples is on the range of integers between 0 and 255.
Experimental results: The results of running VGG model on CIFAR-10 dataset are summarized in Table 5 . Four different training strategies are compared: (1) original model; (2) stability training (Zheng et al., 2016) ; (3)Siamese training used as regularization; (4) Siamese training alone. The first column of Table 5 shows different levels of attack power. Test accuracies reported in Figure 5 and Table 5 show that Siamese training greatly decreases the effectiveness of the adversarial attacks. Even with a very strong attack, the accuracy of our model is still good comparing to baseline methods. Interestingly, VGG model after two different Siamese training obtains much higher values in both ARC and ARCA. More specifically, Siamese training increases ARC and ARCA by more than 55%. Using Siamese training as a regularization improves ARC and ARCA over baselines by more than 60%. More surprisingly, Siamese training slightly improves the test accuracy of the original model even for the case of "attack power = 0". As discussed in Section 3.6, we think oracle f 2 should be continuous a.e. . Siamese training may reduce overfitting of the original DNN. Therefore, it's not surprising that the performance can even be slightly increased. 
CONCLUSION
Machine learning techniques were not designed to withstand manipulations made by intelligent and adaptive adversaries. This paper focuses on providing a theoretical framework for understanding the robustness of learning-based classifiers, especially DNN in the face of such adversaries at test time. By investigating the topology between two metric spaces corresponding to predictor and oracle, we develop several theoretical conditions that can determine if a classifier is strong-robust against adversarial samples. Then taking advantages of theoretical results, a novel measure named ARC is proposed to quantify the robustness of classification models under adversarial noise. Furthermore we show that "Siamese architecture" can be used to enhance the adversarial robustness of DNN models. Empirically results show that "Siamese training" outperforms another state-of-the-art defense strategy.
6 APPENDIX OF PROBLEM FORMULATION 6.1 PREVIOUS DEFINITIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AT TESTING TIME Machine learning has been popular in classifying malicious (y = 1) versus benign (y = −1) in computer security tasks. For such a context, two previous definitions of adversarial attacks exist: (Biggio et al., 2013) uses the formula as follows: argmin
(6.1) (Lowd & Meek, 2005) uses the following formula: argmin
Here d max is a constant. Clearly, these two formulas are not equivalent.
A GENERAL DEFINITION OF ADVERSARIAL TEST SAMPLE PROBLEM
Most previous studies focus on classification tasks. However, other machine learning tasks also suffer from adversarial attacks. We can easily extend our definition to general machine learning situations.
Definition 6.1. Adversarial test sample problem for general machine learning tasks:
Given an original sample x, find a sample x , such that ∃0 < δ, < c < 1, |f 1 (x) − f 1 (x )| > δ and |f 2 (x) − f 2 (x )| < .
A GENERAL DEFINITION OF STRONG-ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES
Definition 6.2. Strong-robustness of machine learning models against adversarial samples Given a test sample x ∈ R n a.e., if ∀x ∈ R n and 0 < < c < 1 and |f 2 (x) − f 2 (x )| < , there exists 0 < δ < c < 1 such that |f 1 (x) − f 1 (x )| < δ. Then we call the learned predictor f 1 (·) to be strong-robust against adversarial attacks at test time.
A COUNTER-EXAMPLE OF THE CONTINUITY ASSUMPTION
A counter-example can be as following: Suppose a predictor function f (x) = 1 p(x,y=1)> 1 2 for a classification problem, where p(x, y = 1) is the probability density function. Assuming the p(x, y = 1) is a continuous a.e. function, we define a probability density function p 0 as:
Notice that p 0 is still the probability density function. However, f 0 (x) = 1 p0(x,y=1)> 1 2 is nowhere continuous in the set {x|f (x) = 1}. This is an extreme case, but it shows that a learned probability function might not be continuous a.e.. 
